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ABSTRACT 
 
Technological advances have facilitated investment in collectibles through online 
auction markets, where information regarding product characteristics, current and 
historical prices, and product availability is available to millions of market 
participants. However, market inefficiencies may still exist, where prices do not 
reflect market information and where savvy speculators can profit. Using unit root 
and variance ratio tests, we examine 8538 rare stamp and 56,997 rare coin 
auctions to evaluate the efficiency of online markets. In particular, we study 
market liquidity, abnormal returns and weak-form efficiency. We find an inverse 
relationship between market efficiency and liquidity. Bidder competition intrinsic 
to liquidity increases the chances that uninformed bidders drive up item prices, 
leading to the observed market inefficiencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is common knowledge among investors that thin markets are less efficient than 
markets that have broader following and participation. Many housing markets, 
some stock markets, mortgage-backed securities markets, and collectible 
markets represent examples of thin markets, where purchase and sales 
transactions, trading, and exchange may be sporadic, and price discovery may 
be challenging. Together, nevertheless, they represent billions of dollars of 
exchange in market transactions. Increasingly, we are seeing relatively thin 
markets being impacted by the burgeoning technologies of the Internet, 
permitting such innovative approaches to transaction-making as electronic call 
auctions, reverse auctions, and numerous forms of digital intermediation. 
 
With so much price information available to bidders and sellers in online 
auctions, the question of market efficiency in these collectible markets presents 
itself. By market efficiency, we mean that the market price is based upon all 
information available in the market. From this perspective, weak-form efficiency 
in a market occurs where the price for every good on the market reflects all 
historical information, and is available to any market participant [13]. Market 
efficiency is different from operational efficiency in that it deals with equal access 
to information by all market participants. By contrast, operational efficiency deals 
with maximizing some aspect of the operation, with little concern about the 
transfer of information among all participants in the market. For example, Vragov 
[49] discusses how online auctions are operationally efficient in that they allow 
the seller to maximize common and private value surplus. 
 
Intermediaries utilize technology to bring together geographically-fragmented 
markets, as a way to improve financial efficiency and market quality. These 
markets exhibit the classical characteristics of thin markets. We investigate the 
efficiency and persistence of abnormal returns in collectible markets. Collectibles 
are often viewed as an investment alternative, which can be used for 
diversification or as a hedge against inflation (like gold bullion) with some rare 
coins even quadrupling in value after several years. Swiatek [47] discusses how 
rare coins can be appealing in a bear market, and Pesando [41], Mei and Moses 
[37], and Wood [50] compare collectible returns to stock market prices using 
financial economics theory, like the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Ashenfelter and Graddy [4] also point out research that shows returns on 
collectible items can surpass returns from fixed income securities. 
 
Typically, auctions have not been viewed as very efficient markets, as an 
uninformed bidder could end up paying too much for an item or a seller could end 
up selling an item for a fraction of its worth [43] and [48]. Internet technologies, 
however, have increased the flow and availability of information in online 
auctions, allowing millions to interact, and promoting participation across the 
globe. This technological transformation has made auctions into a type of 
exchange, akin to a stock or commodities exchange. Indeed, the volume of 
transactions in online auctions now surpasses the volume of stocks that are 
bought and sold in many countries. With many more items for sale, and many 
more bidders bidding, online auctions allow collectibles as investments to take on 
a new practicality, making investments in collectibles bought and sold in online 
auctions more feasible for the typical investor. Through this lens, we investigate 
how efficiency has adjusted with market liquidity, as more buyers and sellers 
have entered the online auction market and the ratio of buyers to sellers has 
changed. 
 
Abnormal returns occur when price levels differ from expected or previous sale 
prices, resulting in high or low returns for an investor. They occur due to new 
information in the market. Abnormal returns in an efficient market are persistent, 
indicating that other investors share a new common valuation, whereas an 
inefficient market with low levels of persistent returns indicates that abnormal 
returns are ignored. Then prices revert back to the mean price after the abnormal 
return occurs. We do not deny that under-informed bidders may make bids that 
may be too high, yet the existence of high bids is likely to inflate the price that 
rational and informed investors will be wiling to pay for an asset. 
 
In efficient markets, abnormal returns reflect new information, so that abnormal 
returns in one period carry forward to future prices. In inefficient markets, the 
effect of abnormal returns are often minimized or eliminated, as prices revert to a 
mean price. With this in mind, we will not claim that online auctions, in their 
current form at least, can ever be viewed as completely efficient markets. We will 
explore the persistence of abnormal returns to determine how much current 
returns seem to affect the level of future returns. We will check if future returns 
are unpredictable, as they would be in an efficient market. 
 
We ask: Are online auction markets, such as those for rare coins and rare stamp 
markets, efficient? What factors might affect the persistence of abnormal returns 
in online auctions? How can we measure the efficiency and persistence of 
abnormal returns on assets traded in online markets? Can we implement a 
research design to assess the efficiency and persistence of abnormal returns in 
online auctions for collectible coins and stamps? How does the amount of trading 
activity play a role? 
 
There are major differences between a stock market, where market efficiency is 
typically studied, and an online auction market. The first difference deals with 
short selling, where investors can take advantage of an overpriced stock by 
selling the stock now and agreeing to buy it later. There is no way to easily mimic 
short selling in online auction markets, thus allowing inflated prices to persist. A 
collectibles investor is able to place an item for sale, and then purchase it in the 
same market later, but the immediacy of the stock market is not present. The 
second difference deals with the effects of individual bidders. Unlike the stock 
market, two bidders can drive a price above the normal valuation for an item. 
(This is a basis for winner's curse in online auctions.) These two factors can 
introduce inflated prices for an item, as two or more bidders bid up its price, 
resulting in high prices that may persist for the sale of the item in the future. 
 
Far from making inefficiency irrelevant though, the differences between online 
auction markets and stock markets make studying efficiency imperative for 
investors. Online auctions have challenges that stock markets do not. Since 
investors make money by taking advantage of inefficiencies, these inefficiencies 
can make online auctions potentially more profitable than stock market 
investments. We will expose inefficiencies that may exist in online auction 
collectible markets for the investor to exploit. To do this, we provide a measure of 
weak-form efficiency in online auctions for collectibles, and confirm a relationship 
between market efficiency and market liquidity in the rare coin and rare stamp 
markets. Thus, increases in market liquidity (marked by an increase in bidder 
competition) lead to decreases in online auction market efficiency. The 
theoretical intuition that drives this finding is that, with stock markets, increase in 
the number of investors would indeed lead to greater efficiency as more investors 
search to profit from inefficiencies. By contrast, in online auctions, high liquidity 
involves many bidders competing for the same item. It increases the likelihood 
that uninformed collectors drive up collectibles prices. 
 
We draw upon theory in financial economics for this work. IS researchers are 
often concerned with how information is transferred among participants in online 
systems, and the effects this information has on system users. This becomes 
especially interesting when the system is a market, and the market is created 
with the new technologies of the Internet. We leverage the theory of market 
efficiency to discover the effects of the flow of information on prices in an 
electronic market. 
 
We assess online auctions for collectible coins and stamps as a type of market 
exchange. We focus on rare coins and stamps that are commonly traded. We 
treat instances where the amount of trading and transaction-making varies, 
permitting us to consider what happens in online markets with more thinly-traded 
assets. Our research design enables us to investigate how the persistence of 
abnormal returns increases with market liquidity, as the ratio of buyers to 
auctions changes in online auction markets. This lets us determine how market 
liquidity may affect efficiency and the persistence of abnormal returns based on 
the price changes. Using unit root tests attributable to Dickey and Fuller [16] and 
variance ratio analysis based on Lo and MacKinlay [33] on data from a multi-year 
study involving two different markets, we show that online markets tend to be 
efficient if the number of auctions is relatively large in relation to the number of 
bidders. Although trading in online auctions is thinner than in the stock markets, 
we nevertheless find that online auctions increase the viability of investments in 
collectibles as an alternative to stocks because of their wide reach and the extent 
of seller and bidder participation. 
 
Section 2 assesses relevant theory for thin markets and technology, collectible 
auctions, and the related concepts of market efficiency, as a basis for our model 
development. Section 3 discusses the specification of unit root and variance ratio 
tests, as well as some adjustments that enable us to estimate our data for 
relatively thinly-traded collectibles exchanged in online auctions. Section 4 lays 
out our empirical analysis of a large set of data on collectible coins. We begin 
with an overview of the data set, continue with a discussion of modeling and 
estimation issues that are specific to a market (e.g., the rare coin market or the 
rare stamp market), and finish with a presentation of the econometric results and 
their interpretation. Section 5 discusses the collectible stamp data that we 
analyze, and the contrasting results that we obtained. Thereafter, Section 6 
provides an interpretation of our results, and analyzes the patterns of abnormal 
returns observed in the collectible coin and stamp markets. We conclude with 
limitations and future research. 
 
 
2. ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
We next discuss properties of thin markets, collectibles auction, and market 
efficiency concepts. 
 
 
2.1. Thin markets and technology 
 
Certain factors that exist in markets can cause inefficiencies. For example, the 
depth of the market is often limited by the degree to which assets are traded in 
different physical, geographic, or electronic virtual locations, causing market 
fragmentation. Also, Mendelson [38] points out that market fragmentation can 
occur when potential market participants cannot find one another, do not know 
that the other party exists, or otherwise cannot transact because of spatial, 
informational or other types of barriers. When there are relatively fewer traders in 
a market with thinly-traded assets, the market is more likely to be fragmented. 
The trading of securities before the advent of the telegraph is a classic example 
of fragmented markets, as discussed by Garbade and Silber [23]. Securities 
traded at vastly different prices at different stock exchanges around the United 
States because information could not travel between the exchanges quickly. The 
telegraph, a technological innovation with sweeping and dramatic effects, almost 
immediately brought together geographically-separated markets, bringing greater 
similarity in prices. Just as technology was able to close the information gap in 
geographically-fragmented but relatively deep markets, so technology can help 
market participants to find one another in markets where assets are more thinly 
traded. When the markets consolidate, market prices will better reflect 
information that is known to all participants across the space that the market can 
cover. 
 
Markets with thin trading of assets are more likely to be volatile than deeper 
markets, all else equal, due to the lack of price discovery [46]. At the heart of 
efficiency studies is the availability and transfer of accurate information about an 
asset. Transaction-making provides a basis for information to be exchanged by 
sellers and buyers about price levels that are appropriate, so when there are 
fewer transactions, as with traditional offline auctions, it becomes more difficult to 
determine the appropriate price. Although stock markets, with millions of traders 
per day, will always have more transactions than online auction markets, at least 
for the foreseeable future, Internet technology has given online auctions a large 
increase in market depth with the ability to transfer information on millions of 
transactions that allow much information to transfer among buyers and sellers. 
This reduces market fragmentation and allowing analysis of online auction 
transactions at a new level and giving online auction researchers the ability to 
analyze online auctions using well-developed financial tools. 
 
 
2.2. Private valuation and common valuation 
 
Private values arise from a collector’s personal valuation for an asset that is not 
shared by the rest of the market. For example, if the next coin or stamp they 
target completes a collection, then the collector may be willing to pay more for 
the item. With no common valuation, financial economics topics such as 
efficiency become moot since private valuation affects bid levels rather than 
commonly-held information. Although many contend that private valuation almost 
always exists in collectible markets, recent research from Bajari and Hortaçsu [5] 
and Easley et al. [19] empirically demonstrate that there is a significant common 
value component to online auctions of collectibles, specifically rare coin online 
auctions. Their results show that although private valuation may (and probably 
does) occur in online auctions, the common valuation component is powerful 
enough to allow coin bid levels to be compared across bidders and across 
auctions. 
 
We have examined common and private valuation in online auctions in two ways. 
First, we have implemented Bajari and Hortaçsu's [5] technique and have 
supported their finding that a significant level of common valuation exists in our 
collectible data, such that the level of valuation attributable to common valuation 
significantly exceeds the level of valuation attributable to private valuation. 
Second, we have conducted unit root tests which show that private valuation has 
no significant impact on our results. Thus, we are confident that common 
valuation dominates the online coin and stamp auction markets. Analysis of 
these markets can be achieved by using existing empirical tools for financial 
economics. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Theoretical perspectives on market efficiency 
 
Samuelson [44] developed the efficient market hypothesis, which contends that 
markets, like the stock market, tend to reflect all information that market 
participants have available. Because stock prices in an efficient market reflect all 
available information, no one can accurately predict which stocks outperform or 
underperform in the next period in an efficient market. Unexpected or abnormal 
returns in one period persist into all later periods, and it is impossible to predict 
whether the price will rise or fall, even after an abnormally large price increase or 
decrease. Furthermore, efficiency is the result of savvy investors who scour the 
market searching for inefficiencies, recognizing that asset prices that do not 
reflect all available information. This can lead to exceptional profits, and prices of 
investments automatically self-correct based on new information. Thus, even if a 
multitude of investors are inexperienced and prone to mistakes, an efficient 
market will force the price to reflect all available information. 
 
The efficient market hypothesis has been widely researched as it applies to the 
stock market [3], [22], [25] and [28]. Boudoukh et al. [8] have noted that there are 
large and statistically significant autocorrelations and serial cross-correlations 
between portfolio returns over a short horizon. This goes against the efficient 
market hypothesis. Some researchers maintain that these correlations do not 
inform investors in any meaningful way, so that the aim of market efficiency is 
furthered. For example, research in the early 1960s [2], [12], [26] and [29] mostly 
provided strong support for the hypothesis that stock investments follow a 
random walk, which gave securities analysts no basis to predict prices from one 
period to the next. Fama [20] discussed how, in tests of the random walk, 
researchers by and large are unable to statistically reject the efficient market 
hypothesis (also called the random walk hypothesis). However, in a later article, 
Fama and French [21] rejected the random walk model on the basis of analysis 
of additional data. 
 
More recently, Malkiel [36] commented on new findings on autocorrelations and 
serial cross-correlations for short horizon returns. He claimed that data mining 
that has been performed in some studies has resulted in findings that are 
surprising but still spurious, for example, the work of Lo and MacKinlay [33]. Also, 
he suggests that reviewers of papers at the leading journals have tended to set 
aside confirmatory results as lacking surprise value, while more surprising results 
that show deviations from a random walk may be more readily accepted in peer 
review, leading to a disconfirmation bias of existing theory. Malkiel further argued 
that any statistically significant variation from a random walk is not significant in a 
practical sense. Any gain that can be acquired from taking advantage of market 
inefficiencies is so small so as to not exceed the operational costs involved in 
adjusting an investment position. 
 
Lo and MacKinlay [32] and [33] have argued that unit roots are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for random walk efficiency tests, based upon Fama's [20] definition 
of efficiency. These authors and others have shown that efficiency is a unit root 
only under the assumption of risk neutrality [30], [31] and [34]. Lo and MacKinlay 
[33] stress that risk-averse investors will have a well-functioning efficient market, 
and prices that can be forecasted in an efficient market, only such that the 
market reflects all available information. 
 
Research on financial markets divides market efficiency into three categories [7] 
and [13]. Weak-form efficiency occurs where excess returns cannot be estimated 
using historical financial information. Semi-strong form efficiency exists where 
market prices reflect all publicly available information. Strong-form efficiency 
ensues when market prices reflect all publicly available and privately held 
information. We will examine collectible coins and stamps, and focus only on 
whether it is possible to estimate returns based on historical financial information. 
We do not address news items about new finds or the scarcity of coins and 
stamps, due to the limitations that we faced with the collection of relevant data. 
Thus, we examine weak-form efficiency. 
 
We theorize that market liquidity has the opposite effect in stock markets as in 
online auctions. Liquidity implies that there are more buyers bidding on the 
assets in an exchange. In stock markets, informed bidders bid up an under-
valued asset and bid down an overvalued asset through short selling. This 
permits an investor to sell at item immediately at an overvalued price and to buy 
it at a later date. Higher liquidity implies that there is a greater probability of two 
informed investors entering a market to drive the price to an efficient level. 
 
The absence of short selling in online auctions makes market liquidity have the 
opposite effect on online auction market efficiency. By definition, a highly liquid 
item has a large number of potential bidders, resulting in an increased chance 
that two uninformed bidders will bid up an item. With no short-selling mechanism 
though, there is no way for informed bidders to bid down an overpriced asset in 
online auctions. So even though we agree with the literature in that market 
liquidity has a positive effect on market efficiency in stock markets, we contend 
that the absence of short selling in online auctions should add inefficiencies to 
online auction markets and cause market liquidity to have an inverse relationship. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGIES FOR ESTIMATING EFFICIENCY IN ONLINE MARKETS 
 
We investigate market efficiency and the persistence of abnormal returns related 
to asset price differences over time in the collectible coin and stamp markets. We 
next illustrate the use of unit root tests to examine returns to stamp and coin 
trading, similar to Fama's [20] investigation of efficiency in the stock market. Such 
tests enable us to deliver a new reading on the persistence of abnormal market 
returns, as discussed by Grossman and Stiglitz [24], that may exist for collectible 
coin and stamp trading at various points in time in Internet markets. Our goal is to 
determine how market liquidity, as measured by the ratio of buyers to auctions, 
may affect a traded asset's returns, based on past patterns of returns in online 
auctions for collectible stamps and coins. We develop empirical models to 
address econometric challenges of measuring efficiency in markets that exhibit 
thin trading of assets. 
 
 
3.1. Market efficiency tests using unit roots 
 
To examine the effects of market liquidity on the degree of efficiency and 
persistence of abnormal returns in online coin and stamp auctions, it is 
necessary to define each collectible i   in terms of the percentage of the price that 
obtained during the first time it traded relative to a later period t  . We then 
evaluate the return on each traded asset based upon  and 
ΔPit = Pit − Pi,t − 1, so that: 
 
 
  (1) 
 
where 
priceit  the final selling price for the collectible item i on day t; 
pricei1  the average price for the collectible item i on the first day that it 
sells; 
Pit  the indexed price for the collectible item i on day t; 
ΔPit the indexed price change for the collectible item i on day t 
compared to the previous selling price at time t − l; 
Rit  the percentage return for the collectible item i on day t. 
 
 
Malkiel [35] and [36] initially presented the idea that future returns on market-
traded assets are not predictable from past price performance in an efficient 
market. Thus, prices in efficient markets should follow a random walk. Consider 
the following autoregression function of asset returns: 
 
Rit=αi+βiRi,t−l+εit.      (2) 
 
This expression is a unit root test for stationarity, as advocated by Dickey and 
Fuller [16]. The estimated change in returns, Rit, on asset i in the current period t 
are defined as a function of returns in a previous period t − l, plus a drift 
parameter α that is specific to asset i. The parameter, βi, can provide information 
on whether returns for asset i are predictable based on previous returns. βi can 
be expressed as: 
 
    (3) 
 
 
Malkiel [36] contends that a random walk occurs when βi = 1. He further 
describes how returns based on random walks characterize an efficient market. 
He goes on to note that various stock market anomalies, such as the 2000 
dotcom bubble burst, were devastating because they were not anticipated. This 
adds support for the random walk model as a test of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
If βi − 1 is significantly different from 0, then βi will be significantly different from 1, 
and there will be a predictable drift in returns rather than a pure random walk. 
Note that β is not the same as that used in risk-return models such as CAPM. 
However, the parameter is consistent in its use relative to other tests of the 
Dickey–Fuller method when a unit root test is implemented. With βi close to 1, 
price changes are persistent, and thus current price changes are reflected in 
prices well into the foreseeable future. When βi = 1, our best estimate of Rit is 
drift parameter αi plus the return in the previous period Ri,t − 1. Though we have an 
estimate, we have no way to know whether the return in this period will 
outperform or underperform that expectation. As βi approaches zero, prices more 
immediately revert to a mean price, and price changes do not persist. 
 
 
3.2. Market efficiency tests using variance ratios 
 
Lo and MacKinlay [32] and [33] and Cochrane [10] have suggested that a 
variance ratio test is more appropriate than a unit root test to determine if a 
series follows a random walk. They state that for a random walk of asset returns 
to exist, such as those that might be seen for returns on certain investments, the 
variances of the returns must be uncorrelated. Moreover, they state that the 
asset return variances should be consistent across periods for any traded asset if 
market efficiency is thought to exist. See Lo and MacKinlay [33] for additional 
details. So a data set of returns on a given set of assets can be segmented and 
then the variances can be compared for consistency. Following Lo and 
MacKinlay [33], we define Xt = ln(Pt) as the logarithm of price for asset i (with this 
subscript suppressed). 
 
To make this more concrete, the reader should recognize that data sets can be 
segmented based on returns on assets across different periods of time and that 
no matter how the segmentation occurs, for a market to be efficient, the 
variances should be the same across each segment. For example, one-period 
returns, Xt − Xt − 1, can be compared to two-period returns, Xt − Xt − 2, and so on. 
Segmentation of the data can also involve cuts of asset returns based on other 
period returns, such as three-period returns and four-period returns. Examining 
four-period returns, for example, might yield four subsets, q, each with n = 2500 
asset returns each, for nq = 2500 · 4 = 10,000 total observations in the data set. 
 
The unbiased maximum-likelihood estimators of the mean, µ, and variance, σ2, of 
the transaction prices, based upon the observed returns in terms of the one-
period difference of observed asset prices, Xt − Xt − 1, are as follows for q 
segments of the data, each with n observations: 
 
 
     (4) 
 
and 
 
   (5) 
 
 
 
 
In Eqs. (4) and (5), µ̂ and σ̂2 are estimates of the mean, µ, and variance, σ2, with 
a sample composed of q subsamples with n observations each seen in the 
adjustments 1/nq and 1/(nq − 1). The denominator of the right-hand side of the 
expression for the variance reflects an adjustment for q > 1 segments. 
 
To describe the intuition behind their use, we employ the arguments of Cochrane 
[10], who used variance ratios to examine random walks for GDP. Imagine that 
prices follow a pure random walk, as shown in Eq. (1) above. Cochrane showed 
that a random walk then can be expressed in terms of the number of time-
differenced segments into which the data are split. If the asset's returns do not 
exhibit a trend because there is no reversion to the mean, then the variance of its 
returns will approach a constant, 2σ2, which is twice the conditional variance of 
the series. Reversion to the mean, in this context, implies that the serial 
correlation of the returns becomes more negative as the holding period of the 
asset lengthens (up to some point) [10]. This reversion to the mean, which is a 
stationary series per Dickey and Fuller [16], is indicative of an inefficient market. 
An efficient market occurs when the expected return is the previous period's 
return, which Dickey and Fuller note is a non-stationary series. 
 
If the asset prices, Xt, revert toward a mean value, then Xt will be trend-
stationary, and the trend line for the series should decline toward zero. Lo and 
MacKinlay [32] describe a technique for a maximum-likelihood unbiased 
estimation of var(Xt − Xt − 1) that allows for overlapping time differences of Xt 
when the variance σ̂q2 is estimated. The idea of overlapping time differences 
comes with the differences in asset prices between period t and t − 2, t − 1 and 
t − 3, and t − 2 and t − 4, etc., as opposed to with sequential time differences, t 
and t − 1, and then between t − 1 and t − 2, for example. This allows for an entire 
range of values in a data set to be used, maximizing the use of the available 
information. It also permits the analyst to evaluate the use of nq − q + 1 
observations, rather than fewer observations, as would be the case if no overlaps 
were allowed. This gives rise to an estimated subsample variance: 
 
 
 
    (6) 
 
where 
 
    (7) 
 
Consistent with Lo and MacKinlay [32], we define the variance ratio as: 
 
        (8) 
 
 
  
 We relied on Lo and MacKinlay for their derivation of the variance ratio. The 
interested reader should examine their work for the logic and additional details of 
derivation of the variance ratio as a means to test market efficiency. If a market is 
efficient for the q subsets of the data that are examined, then it should be that 
Vq ≅ 1. This indicates that the variance of the returns remains relatively constant 
throughout all time periods q that are considered. If Vq is significant and different 
than 1, then the variance of the returns is not consistent over time, and this 
provides some evidence of inefficiency in the market. When Vq approaches zero, 
this is indicative of reversion to the mean. This might imply that there is a mean 
price and that markets which overprice an asset will tend to correct in the next 
cycle. On the other hand, when Vq is significant and greater than one in the 
presence of positive first-order autocorrelation (e.g., with the continuation of a 
trend), indicates that good returns on an investment in one period are indicative 
of continuing good investment returns in the future. 
 
Lo and MacKinlay [32] suggest a statistic, zq⁎, to test for market efficiency in the 
presence of heteroskedastic error terms: 
 
   (9) 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis, H0, is that there is a random walk in asset price changes, 
indicating market efficiency and no opportunities for achieving abnormal returns. 
Under the null hypothesis, then, the zq⁎ statistic should have a zero mean. A 
non-zero mean, in contrast, will be an indicator of the absence of a random walk 
in this environment, as well as an indicator of the presence of market inefficiency. 
We detected heteroskedasticity in our data, which is not surprising. Lo and 
MacKinlay [33] introduced a homoskedastic error term, z(k), to cover the case 
where heteroskedasticity cannot be detected. The authors point out that returns 
on most assets, including stocks, usually show some degree of 
heteroskedasticity. We determined that tests which assume homoskedasticity are 
not appropriate for this research. The heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators 
are: 
 
 
     (10)  
 
 
and 
 
  (11) 
  
 
 
 
3.3. Appropriateness and challenges of efficiency analysis for online 
auction market returns 
 
We next will justify the use of unit root and variance ratio tests that are developed 
in financial economics for application to the online auctions. There are crucial 
differences between the stock market and the online auction market. We address 
these differences by looking at how they affect our financial analysis, and 
discussing the contrasting econometric techniques can be used to handle these 
differences. 
 
 
3.3.1. Information and ability 
 
Professional investors who invest in the stock market are well informed, and 
equipped with the necessary training to be effective market traders. The same 
probably cannot be said for participants in the online auction markets. They 
should be viewed as hobbyists for the most part. Nevertheless, there are many 
professional traders among them. They act as professional dealers who often 
operate real-world collectible coin and stamp shops. Few of them know about 
valuation techniques involving risk and return, or the application of net present 
value or portfolio management techniques to control risk. 
 
Bodie et al. [7] point out that trained investors will take advantage of any 
inefficiencies in stock markets, making inefficiencies disappear by the time typical 
investors can profit from them. Thus, all stock investors do not need to be 
informed, but rather just a segment of the market needs to be informed in order 
for price-correcting transactions to be made so that markets approach efficiency. 
This may be different for the online auction markets, where a pair of uninformed 
bidders can raise the price of an item to a level that informed bidders are not 
willing to match. 
 
 
3.3.2. Uniformity 
 
It may be tempting to view financial products like stocks, as being uniform across 
the market while products in online auction markets, such as rare coins and 
stamps, might be heterogeneous in quality. However, stocks change not only 
from stock to stock, but also from day to day as well, so that even companies can 
change drastically in relatively short periods. Coin and stamps do not vary much 
and are uniform across investors and time, unlike stocks. Thus, they are more 
similar to commodities than stocks. 
 
The only differences between coins and stamps occur in terms of four factors: 
year minted or printed; the denomination of the coin or stamp; whether there are 
special conditions that are noteworthy relative to value, such as mint marks or 
mounting hinges; and the overall condition. These factors are probably more 
easily discerned than that myriad of factors that can affect a stock price, and all 
of these factors are easily detectible through the kind of text-based pattern 
matching that we have implement in the data collection work in this research. 
Moreover, most collectors typically agree on the valuation of a collectible once 
these four criteria have been identified. 
3.3.3. Regulation 
 
Both stock markets and online auction markets have the potential for information 
asymmetry. “Insider traders” can use non-public information to profitably trade, 
taking advantage of uninformed investors, while online auction sellers can 
misrepresent the quality of the product that they are selling. However, though 
these markets have the potential for information asymmetry, both have 
introduced steps that limit the effect of information asymmetry. For the stock 
market, regulation exists that insist on accurate reporting of information for 
investors, and punish insider trading, so that traders are prohibited from profiting 
from insider information. 
 
There are fewer regulations for online auction transactions than there are for 
stock markets, yet anti-fraud regulations apply to sales in online auctions, with 
the possibility of lawsuits and even criminal action if a product is misrepresented. 
In addition, online auction marketplaces, like eBay, implement reputation 
systems that can hurt an opportunistic seller's future sales. Reputation systems 
have the twofold effect of deterring seller opportunism and punishing fraudulent 
or opportunistic actions [14] and [15]. This tends to drive out sellers who profit 
from information asymmetries and reduces the chance that an online auction 
market devolves into a “market for lemons” [1]. 
 
 
3.3.4. Thin markets 
 
Thin markets occur when certain assets trade infrequently in comparison to 
others. In some settings, trading of these assets may be insufficient to the extent 
that it is not possible to effectively support price discovery for them. In research 
involving stock returns, the number of periods between trades of an asset is often 
set to 1 (or l = 1). For thinly-traded assets though, this cannot always be done. It 
may be two or more periods between trades, so that the pattern of trading is 
spotty, and it is not always possible to obtain transaction data for asset prices 
period by period. Our research is focused on evaluating market efficiency for 
collectible items, and specifically those that are thinly-traded. Other researchers 
have previously examined the efficiency of the collectible art market, where 
trading occurs in a similar way and makes price discovery more difficult 
[6] and [41]. 
 
To address the impact of thin trading for the evaluation of market efficiency in a 
specific market, Dimson and Marsh [18] recommended making adjustments to 
account for infrequent trades. Although their method is typically used when 
analyzing risk-adjusted returns, the same intuition applies to the empirical unit 
root analysis that we will conduct for this research. A thinly-traded investment 
weighting approach can be derived from their weighting scheme recommended 
to reduce the impact of thinly-traded securities when using the unit root test for 
an asset via: 
 
  (12) 
 
 
 
The variable d indicates the number of periods that have elapsed since the last 
trade of asset i up to time t. Without adjustment, thinly-traded investments have a 
corrupting effect on unit root regression analysis. A number of methods can be 
used to adjust for infrequent trading as well. For example, Bradfield [9] describes 
two categories. One category is referred to as Cohen methods, which use 
aggregation of lagged and leading regression coefficients [11], [17] and [45]. The 
second category is trade-to-trade methods, which weight transactions based on 
the number of periods since the last trade, especially Dimson and Marsh [18]. 
The Dimson–Marsh correction adjusts the weight of thinly-traded assets in the 
regression, and reducing the inflating effect that thinly-traded investments have 
on the value of β. 
 
 
4. STUDY 1: ONLINE MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR COLLECTIBLE COINS 
 
We now turn to a discussion and analysis of the first of two collectible markets: 
coins. 
 
 
4.1. The collectible rare coin data 
 
We employed a software agent to collect prices on coins that were transacted on 
eBay during various periods across the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, 2002 and 
2005. The earlier years of data were collected between April 24 and September 
10, 2002. The later 2005 data were obtained in 2006. Data collection agents only 
included auctions of individual coins. They excluded auctions that did not sell the 
items that were offered, auctions that ended with a buy-it-now option, and listings 
that contained multiple items. 
 
Admissible coins in our data set required that they had to have transacted for 
US$10 or more. This helps to increase the probability that coin transactions were 
the product of more knowledgeable and committed collectors, as opposed to 
“newbies” who might only be willing to spend several dollars to try out trading in 
the online environment. Our customized software agent can discriminate among 
other aspects of the description of a coin to effectively identify the exact coin for 
sale. It also can tell whether the transaction item was not actually a coin, but 
some sort of coin-collecting related supplies or commemorative medals, etc. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive information about the data that we used for this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Estimation issues 
 
There are a number of issues that affect the validity of empirical tests of financial 
theories. One consideration is the extent to which the findings of an analysis of 
market efficiency may be susceptible to the presence of outliers and extreme 
points in the data. To reduce the possibility of corruption due to influential data 
points, we employed an outlier test recommended by Neter et al. [40]. This led to 
the removal of about 2% (actually 748 or 1.99%) of the observations out of the 
37,584 total observations. 
 
Unit root analysis relies heavily on regression results to test for a unit root, a 
coefficient of one on an autoregressive term in a regression. We employ robust 
regression instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) since robust regression is 
more resilient to violations of the classical OLS assumptions. Robust regression 
is resistant to influences of a small part of the data, so even a large subset of 
outlying data will not cause a large change in values of the estimators. A 
common approach to robust regression is M-estimation, introduced by Huber 
[27]. This method uses maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to minimize the 
effects of heteroskedasticity. Another form of robust regression described by 
Mosteller and Tukey [39] is called bi-weight (or bi-square) estimation. It adjusts 
for extreme residuals using an iterative approach that determines a threshold 
point for a constant in a function that has the capacity to place a zero weight on 
extreme values. Our techniques mitigate the effects of heteroskedasticity and 
extreme outliers, which are present in our data. The result is a regression 
technique that yields consistent estimators. 
 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Table 2 contains the results of the Dickey–Fuller unit root analysis, along with a 
column containing the bidder-to-auction ratio, which can be considered as a 
measure of liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity is defined as the ability to sell an asset rapidly, with minimal loss of 
value, anytime within market hours. Publicly-traded securities typically are 
considered to be more liquid than items sold in online auctions because of the 
immediacy with which publicly-traded securities trades are able to be made. 
Thus, liquidity is an important issue in online auctions also. Pratt [42] finds that 
market discounts on closely held firms whose stock is not publicly traded may 
exceed 30%. In online auctions, the more bidders there are, the more liquid the 
auctioned assets, since a high number of bidders allows sellers to sell items 
relatively quickly for good prices. As the number of bidders decreases or the 
number of auctions increases, online auction market liquidity decreases, and 
sellers face greater competition and fewer buyers for their goods, which drives 
prices down. 
 
We weighted our results to reduce the effect of thin trading using the Dimson–
Marsh method, so that the results that we have presented are robust. Our 
confidence in these results was strengthened based on our evaluation of the 
unweighted results, which showed a similar pattern. Similar patterns were also 
demonstrated by the results of tests with outliers removed and also with data 
omitted to facilitate the variance ratio analysis. The t-statistic is negative since 
the coefficient that we tested actually is β − 1 rather than simply β. Coefficient 
estimates of a value β < 1 will return negative t-statistics. 
 
All of the years in Table 2 have unit root β values that are less than 1.0 and 
significant, although one, β2002, is very close to 1. The series of β for all years can 
be interpreted as evidence of inefficiency resulting in reversion to the mean. 
Collectible coin auctions that offer abnormally low or high returns can be 
indicative of underpayment and overpayment by the final bidder. By contrast, in 
an efficient market defined by a random walk, β ought to be statistically no 
different from 1.0. Fig. 1a and b show how the persistence of abnormal returns 
varies with the bidder-to-auction ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  
Test results for the coin data, 1999–2002, and 2005. Note: β = 1.0 means that the current return 
is as likely to increase or to decrease, indicating an efficient market. With estimated values of 
β < 1.0, however, our results suggest inefficiencies in the online coin market. a. Unit root test 
results. b. Bidder-to-auction ratio results. 
 
 
 
 
As the number of bidders increases, the persistence of abnormal returns 
decreases, resulting in more temporary effects from abnormal returns. As the 
number of auctions increases, the persistence of abnormal returns appears to 
increase, indicating that abnormal returns tend to affect asset prices further into 
the future. When unanticipated price changes persist into future sale prices (i.e., 
β = 1.0), we can say that the market is efficient. Similarly, if prices changes do 
not persist into future sales, as is the case with this study (i.e., β < 1.0), this 
indicates the market is inefficient. Once we establish inefficiencies in a market, 
we then examine how long unanticipated price changes affect future price levels, 
if at all. 
 
Fig. 1a and b show that the unit root test and bidder-to-auction ratio results have 
inverse patterns relative for the persistence of abnormal returns, as measured by 
β for the coin data. They nearly sketch mirror images of one another. When the 
bidder-to-auction ratios were closer to the 1.0 level in 1999, 2000, and 2001 (i.e., 
β1999 = 0.749, β2000 = 0.698, β2001 = 0.835), the likelihood that the market was 
efficient was lower due to the lower values of the unit root test parameters. These 
results hint that liquidity is inversely rated to efficiency and persistence in online 
auctions for coins. The relationship may be more complicated; it is possible that 
liquidity loss will scare away sellers, causing a reduction of the number of 
auctions, increasing efficiency and price change persistence in later periods. We 
do not find this here; it may take several years of continuous data collection to 
resolve this issue. A bidder-to-auction ratio near to 1.0 indicates that the number 
of bidders approaches the number of auctions. Because we aggregate at the 
year level, there are very few data points. However, even with a small sample 
size, we find a − 85.9% correlation between the bidder-to-auction ratio and β at 
the yearly level, with a p-value of about 0.02, making this inverse relationship 
statistically significant. This strengthens our observation of an inverse 
relationship between the bidder-to-auction ratio and the persistence of abnormal 
returns. 
 
When the bidder-to-auction ratio fell to the 0.40 level in 2002, the estimated value 
of β from the unit root test approached very close to 1.0 (β2002 = .999), with a tight 
confidence interval of [0.9989, 0.9994]. In 2005, the persistence of abnormal 
returns as they relate to market efficiency, β2005, appears to have fallen to roughly 
0.87, as the bidder-to-auction ratio increased to 0.80. Though our sample size is 
large enough to detect relatively small effects, the estimated value of β2002 from 
the unit root analysis is so close to 1.0 that one could argue that there is no 
practical difference, even though there is a statistically significant difference. This 
is an interesting result. It permits us to preliminarily conclude that the online 
market for collectible coins approached efficiency in 2002. Malkiel [36] makes a 
similar argument with critics of efficiency in the stock market, by claiming that 
markets are so close to efficiency in these cases that profiting from inefficiencies 
won't even cover the listing charges. As can be seen in Fig. 1b, these rises and 
falls roughly correspond to increases and decreases in the bidder-to-auction 
ratio. This offers a strong implication that online auction markets can increase the 
persistence of abnormal returns if there are enough auctions compared to 
bidders. We contend that these results show that, regardless of the number of 
items for sale, the same number of bidders pursues the same number of goods 
looking for purchases. With more auctions to choose from, the persistence of 
abnormal returns appears to increase as bidders are able to better compare 
prices and participate in different auctions. 
 
Cochrane [10] informs us that the variance ratios are indicative of the percentage 
of variability due to a random walk. The variance ratios in all of the tests that we 
conducted hovered around 41% (VAverage = 0.409 to be exact, with 
VMinimum = 0.346 and VMaximum = 0.534). Thus, Table 2 suggests that about 59% of 
the total variance of returns cannot be explained by a random walk. This 
indicates that coin returns are trend-stationary and mean-reverting over this time 
period, and have relatively little permanent random walk component. Thus, using 
both unit root tests and variance ratio tests gives us an indication that coin asset 
prices do regress toward a mean, but that the prices are mean-reverting at 
different rates. They revert more slowly as the number of bidders increases or 
the number of auctions decreases. 
 
 
 
5. STUDY 2: ONLINE MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR COLLECTIBLE STAMPS 
 
We now look at market efficiency and the persistence of abnormal returns over 
time for stamps. 
 
 
5.1. The collectible stamp data 
 
We obtained stamp price data for this study from individual stamp auction sites 
on eBay (via stamps.ebay.com) with the use of software agents to support data 
collection. The agents targeted auctions of U.S. stamps in mint or unused 
condition, issued in or before 1940, with data gathered between April 6, 2007 and 
October 6, 2007. The agents obtained prices, the condition of the stamp for sale 
and the characteristics of buyers and sellers. Item text was analyzed to 
determine standard quality measures for each stamp. (For stamp quality terms, 
see www.glassinesurfer.com/stamp_collecting/gsgrading.shtml.) Typical stamp 
industry standard quality measures include whether the stamp has been used, if 
the gum has been damaged by hinging, how good the color quality is, and 
whether there are problems with the centering of the image in the stamp. As with 
coins, there are also technical terms used to describe a stamp's condition, such 
as “fine,” “very fine,” “fine-very fine,” and “mint.” Items that did not sell, auctions 
with the exercise of a buy-it-now option, and listings containing multiple items 
were excluded. 
 
We gave much consideration to the refinement of the search criteria that 
determined the data we collected. Stamps come in a variety of formats, including 
cancelled and unused, rectangular panes and numbered plate blocks, coils, and 
first-day-of-issue covers. The issues also vary from regular post to air mail, to 
government mail and parcel post, and tax stamps. To limit the scope of our data 
collection, we focused on auctions for single unused stamps. We excluded 
selling multiple stamps (e.g., a roll of stamps), stamp equipment (e.g., mounting 
hinges for placement in a book), or reproductions. We also eliminated auctions 
where the exact stamp could not be identified by the description (e.g., “1977 
Stamp for Sale”) or where the condition of the stamp was suspect (e.g., “extra 
fine, but damaged,” “mint with hole,” etc.). Our filtering effort was intended to 
ensure that stamps were being compared to like stamps. About one out of forty 
auctions whose data we gathered did not fit our criteria, and we excluded them 
from analysis as a result. 
 
Our data can be categorized into two different sub-markets of stamps. Many 
stamp collectors concentrate, on only one of these sub-markets. Table 3 
describes the data that we collected in terms of the different stamp categories. It 
was not feasible to divide the stamp data by time as we did with the coin data. 
There would likely be an overlap in the bidders who were following and bidding 
on the stamps. This would lead to issues in using the number of bidders as a 
proxy for market participants. The overlaps were always less than 25% of the 
total number of bidders, which was acceptable to us, although no overlaps – 
such as in the coin data – would have been better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Estimation issues 
 
Analysis of our stamp data required many of the same controls that were 
required by the coin data set, only based on the different descriptors that are 
used to identify the quality of stamps. These include conditions grades (e.g., 
mint, fine and very fine), and other specialized marks or conditions (e.g., never 
hinged). Our approach regarding the elimination of outliers involved identifying 
and omitting observations for which ln(Price) was outside a band bounded by 
three standard deviations of the mean (i.e., the 99th percentile band). This 
excluded less than 1% of the data. The logarithms of the stamp price change 
data were skewed right, and violated the normality distribution assumptions 
associated with OLS regression. Thus, we employed the same robust bi-weight 
and M-estimation methods as we did for the collectible coins. 
 
In addition to the typical econometric issues that we described earlier for coins, 
and for which we made the appropriate tests and adjustments, one of the primary 
challenges in working with data of the sort that are involved in analyzing online 
stamp market efficiency has to do with the manner in which we determine what 
comparisons are to be made for prices. It is critical to understand what is 
possible in terms of comparing a current transaction price to a prior transaction 
price of a stamp, as a basis for identifying price movement. In our data set of 
stamps, it was possible to observe stamps that traded irregularly (as you might 
expect for markets with thinly-traded assets), sometimes with several days or 
weeks between trades of an individual stamp. As a result, to support effective 
coding, we found that it was appropriate to apply an approach that was used by 
Dimson and Marsh [18], involving weighted measures for the asset returns based 
on the number of days since the time when the previous trade occurred. 
 
Another estimation issue was determining the number of price observations to be 
included to assess price changes via the unit root and the variance ratio 
analyses. Recognizing the limitations of using a small amount of data for the 
price series versus using a small number of auctions, our research design 
involved a trade-off. This trade-off was between including stamps that had 
enough observations in their price change time-series relative to including 
enough bidders and auctions, so as to be representative of the actual trading that 
was occurring in the market. We determined that it was feasible to use stamps 
with fifteen price observations to obtain as few as fourteen price change data 
points, which still yielded a large enough number of bidders and auctions so our 
analytical approach was viable. 
 
 
5.3. Results 
 
Table 4 shows empirical results from an examination of the stamp sub-markets 
for 1800 to 1899 and 1900 to 1940, along with unit root test and variance ratio 
results on the price change series. The bidder-to-auction ratio for stamps from 
1800 to 1899 is 0.35, and for stamps from 1900 to 1940 is 0.32. Although there 
are some notable differences, the results of the stamp data are similar to the 
results of the coin data at a high level of inspection. Both data sets were 
collected from eBay collectors' markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the unit root β values are less than one and significant (β1800–1899 = 0.901, 
p < 0.001; β1900–1940 = 0.898, p < 0.001). This suggests that the online auction 
stamp market is not efficient, and that prices eventually trend toward a mean. 
However, abnormal returns in this market show a high level of persistence and 
tend to revert slowly back to a mean. We are examining daily returns, so even 
values close to 1 but with a significant difference will still revert to a mean. We 
consider these not to be efficient. For example, a 90% persistence of abnormal 
returns indicates that after 30 days only 4.24% (= .9030) of the abnormal returns 
will still be reflected in the price of the item. This further indicates that previous 
abnormally high or low returns are reflected in the market for some time before 
the effects finally disappear. We also conducted sensitivity analysis for the unit 
root coefficients and variance ratios in relation to the minimum number of price 
change observations required inclusion in the study. A time-series of fifteen price 
changes was required. We tested data sets with as few as ten and as many as 
twenty price changes in a group. In each case, the unit roots and the variance 
ratios were significantly different from one. 
 
The variance ratios averaged about 0.37 (VAverage = 0.367, VMinimum = 0.325 and 
VMaximum = 0.428). This suggests that just over 60% of the variation cannot be 
explained by a random walk. Thus, as with the coin data, the stamp data appear 
to be trend-stationary and mean-reverting, at least over the time period that we 
observed the prices of these stamps. The variance ratios are similar for both sub-
markets (i.e., Vq = 2: 0.418; Vq = 3: 0.355; and Vq = 4: 0.330 for the 1900–1940 
stamps versus Vq = 2: 0.428; Vq = 3: 0.347; and Vq = 4: 0.325 for the 1800–1899 
stamps). Though the differences in these variance ratios are not large, the results 
suggest that the amount of variability accounted for by the random walk may be 
associated with an increase in market liquidity as indicated by a decrease in the 
bidder-to-auction ratio. 
 
The 1800 to 1899 stamp sub-market, with 2971 auctions, is roughly half the 
thickness of the 1900 to 1940 stamp sub-market, with 5567 auctions in this 
study. We note that the market thickness, in and of itself, has little effect on the 
variance associated with a random walk. Although the market appears to be 
inefficient in that stamp prices tend to revert to the mean, the abnormal returns 
we observed show a great deal of persistence, approaching 0.9, with 1.0 being 
perfect persistence. Our results are interesting in that the economic literature on 
the thickness of markets does not seem to apply too well to the online auctions in 
this study. However, the inefficiencies we have observed suggest that even 
though technology has improved these thin markets, it still has not completely 
eliminated inefficiencies in online auctions. 
 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
Online auctions have created market liquidity and made available auction-like 
market mechanisms in settings where traditional auctions often have catered to a 
very select and small number of participants. Now online auctions reach millions 
of participants, with thousands of potential bidders for each auction. As market 
depth and liquidity increase in online auctions, researchers should view 
investments in collectibles through the lens of financial economics. We assessed 
coin and stamp markets for efficiency, using methods similar to those used to 
measure efficiency of the stock markets. We applied two different methods of 
measuring random walks to our data. Our exploration of market efficiency here 
points to similarities and differences between the markets. Through this process, 
we are able to point out new findings that contribute to our understanding about 
the potential for speculation in online auctions of collectibles. 
 
Cochrane [10] shows that, for a market to be efficient and contain a random walk, 
the variance needs to be consistent throughout the market. The variance ratio 
ought to be approximately equal to 1.0 in an efficient market. We performed 
variance ratio analysis in the two markets. The variance ratios of the coin sub-
markets that we studied range from 0.346 to 0.534. The results were similar to 
the two stamp sub-markets, where the variance ratios form a tighter range from 
0.325 to 0.428. We observed that in both coin and stamp markets the variability 
that is not explained by random walks hovers around 60%. This result is 
interesting; these markets contain similar variability of the effects of random 
walks in conjunction with different degrees of market liquidity. The conventional 
wisdom suggests greater market depth results in a tendency toward efficiency, 
yet we found that this is not necessarily so with our online auction data. Market 
depth had little effect on efficiency in online auctions, but market liquidity 
measured by the ratio of buyers to auctions seems to have an inverse 
relationship on persistence of abnormal returns in the collectible markets, 
approaching an efficient market as the number of bidders decreases. 
 
Second, using unit root analysis, both our sub-markets showed a significant 
difference in persistence of abnormal returns that appears to have a relationship 
with the bidder-to-auction ratio. We find that the number of bidders in relation to 
the number of auctions seems to be correlated with the persistence of abnormal 
returns, based on period-to-period price changes, in online auction collectible 
markets. Markets with a lower number of bidders per auction showed more 
persistence of abnormal returns than markets with a high number of bidders per 
auction. The persistence of abnormal returns in both the collectible coin and 
stamp markets approaches 1.0 as the bidder-to-auction ratio drops to around 
40%. The increase in persistence of abnormal returns is due to increased in 
bidder competition. When there are more bidders vying for the same item, the 
persistence of the abnormal returns declines. Thus, if bidder competition 
increases and there are more bidders competing for fewer auctions, then an 
individual bidder will have a greater chance to have a larger impact on price. This 
is in strong contrast to a less competitive environment, where bidders can 
choose the auctions in which they wish to participate with greater ease. This will 
tend to stabilize returns and allow abnormal returns to persist into the future. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This research examines the efficiency of Internet auctions from a financial 
economics point of view. We analyzed online auction markets for stamps and 
coins to gauge efficiency, and the possible explanations consistent with the 
observed empirical regularities. 
 
 
7.1. Contributions 
 
Our research points out that that there are differences between the stock market 
and the online auction market, including the inability to sell short in the online 
auction market and the ability of two investors to easily influence the price of 
items in online auction markets. These differences can lead to inefficiencies so 
that the prices of assets sold in online auction markets do not reflect all 
information available to traders and investors in that market. An alert investor can 
make excessive profits when investing in assets in an inefficient market when 
compared to investments made in an efficient market. Our research shows that 
the online auctions that we studied are not altogether efficient, but that they 
approach efficiency as the number of bidders decreases in relation to the number 
of auctions. Our major contribution is to document their presence and show how 
inefficiencies in the collectible online auction markets may arise. A related 
contribution is to show that these inefficiencies can be diminished as the number 
of auctions increases with respect to the number of bidders. Moreover, we point 
out that it is feasible and beneficial in the long run that an inefficient online 
auction market will attract sellers who can profit from these inefficiencies to the 
point where the market approaches efficiency. 
 
We find that the persistence of abnormal returns required for an efficient market 
may ensue as the number of bidders decreases in relation to the number of 
auctions. This is due, we argue, to online auction bidders' ability to examine 
prices in concurrent and past auctions to determine a proper bid level, and to 
observe the lower level of bidder competition, consistent with lower levels of the 
bidder-to-auction ratio. Since eBay's auction mechanism mimics a second-price 
sealed-bid auction, it is impossible for a single uninformed bidder to be a price-
maker. However, two bidders acting in concert can affect a price. As the number 
of bidders decreases or bidders begin to have more auctions to search and 
select (or both), it will be harder to find two uniformed bidders who are bidding on 
the same item. 
 
We have discussed the similarities and differences between the rare coin and 
rare stamp collectible online markets at length in this article. We established 
somewhat different results for collectible stamp auctions than we did for the coin 
markets, although the main features of the results were retained. We found 
evidence of persistent returns rather than full market efficiency with more thinly-
traded stamps, and similar degrees of variance in returns tied to the apparent 
random walk component of returns. 
 
For the collectible coin markets that we analyzed in different time periods 
spanning seven years, we detected an inverse relationship between the 
persistence of abnormal returns and the bidder-to-auction ratio. We also revealed 
inefficiencies in the collectible markets where a speculator might have an 
opportunity to take advantage of abnormally low sale prices for stamps or coins 
and resell them for abnormally high prices. Our variance ratio tests show that 
these inefficiencies are relatively consistent, despite some differences in market 
liquidity over the years. The collectible stamp markets that we analyzed showed 
similar and relatively high levels of persistence of abnormal returns, coupled with 
relatively low bidder-to-auction ratios, as is consistent with what we find in the 
rare coin market. Our unit root tests suggested that abnormal returns of prior 
auctions tend to fade, as the returns revert to their mean levels. 
 
Our research also delivers a number of contributions that offer surprise value and 
interesting new knowledge for academic research in IS, finance, and e-
commerce, and for the managerial practices involved in the development of 
online auction markets. One contribution that we offer is to demonstrate the use 
of empirical evaluation techniques that provide evidence about whether online 
auction markets for collectible coins and stamps are efficient. We also measured 
the persistence of abnormal returns that may occur in these online markets. Our 
empirical analysis shows the interplay between the results of random walk tests, 
based on both unit root tests and variance ratio tests, for market efficiency and 
the persistence of abnormal returns. We examined the bidder-to-auction ratio to 
show contrasts between what happens to our estimates with respect to the unit 
roots for persistence of abnormal returns. We also applied a variance ratio 
analysis approach to gauge the extent to which the movement of coin and stamp 
asset prices and returns in online auctions are comprised of a random walk 
component. We also used unit root tests and variance ratio tests to show the 
extent to which there is reversion to a mean value as a result of market 
inefficiency. Finally, we illustrated the use of different approaches to the 
segmentation of our data to test market efficiency across different numbers of 
periods (and numbers of transactions, in the case of thinner asset trading), as 
well as across different asset categories. 
 
 
7.2. Limitations and future research 
 
We learned that the bidder-to-auction ratio is important in determining the level of 
persistence in abnormal returns in online auctions, and that market liquidity has 
little effect on the persistence of abnormal returns and on the amount of variance 
explained by random walks. Our insights are consistent with various stock market 
phenomena that have been observed by others, such as bubbles, but we 
nevertheless caution readers to limit their interpretation of our results to online 
auctions. 
 
It is appropriate to point out to the reader that there is typically a great deal of 
measurement noise that goes along with the evaluation of online auction 
performance. Our research should not be viewed as an exception to this rule. 
Future research has the potential to provide a clearer picture of the effects of the 
bidder-to-auction ratio, especially in an even larger data set for the stamp market, 
so that we can ensure that there are no overlaps in the population of bidders 
across the different asset categories. In addition, we intentionally dropped certain 
sub-markets for collectible stamps that exhibited too thin trading in the time frame 
of our study. We were not confident that the number of bidders who observed the 
market was accurately reflected when only a small sample of auctions is 
retrieved. Clearly, data from thicker markets are appropriate before such analysis 
should be attempted. Indeed, there needs to be thousands of observations, 
before it is possible to effectively examine a market to determine its efficiency, 
the persistence of abnormal returns after different kinds of shocks occur, and the 
effects of the bidder-to-auction ratio. 
 
We only investigated two markets over a limited period of time. Our findings may 
not generalize to other auction markets. Nevertheless, the methodological 
approach that we have demonstrated should be helpful as a basis for effective 
exploration of different online market contexts. Other researchers will benefit 
from thinking through some new ways to refine our techniques to make them 
more effective. Readers can take away other implications too. Sellers naturally 
want to operate in markets that provide depth, market liquidity, participation, and 
offer appropriate sale prices. They appreciate how online auction markets 
support effective price discovery. Yet they are likely to gravitate toward markets 
with higher levels of participation, since the presence of many bidders and 
auctions creates a basis for inefficiencies and thus the chance that they can sell 
their items at an increased price. Speculators may appreciate inefficiencies – 
both as buyers and sellers – and may wish to participate in online auctions with 
many buyers, but fewer competing auctions, in an effort to profit from the 
available inefficiencies. 
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